Didier Stevens

Thursday 4 November 2021

Update: 1768.py Version 0.0.9

Filed under: My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

This new version of 1768.py, my tool to decode Cobalt Strike beacon configs, brings proper decoding of malleable instructions.

And the license ID statistics have been updated, and 3 new private RSA keys have been added.

Fields 0x000b (Malleable_C2_Instructions), 0x000c (http_get_header) and 0x000d (http_post_header) contain instructions on how to transform data. Until now, my tool did not properly parse these instructions, because I had no need for them. It just extracted the strings found inside the binary data of these fields.

But this has changed, now that I’m improving my tools to parse and decrypt Cobalt Strike network traffic: I need these instructions to properly parse traffic.

Let’s start with a malicious beacon, that uses the default profile:

Field Malleable_C2_Instructions (0x000b) contains instructions on how to transform the data send by the team server to the beacon. For the default profile, like this sample, the instructions are just a print statement: this means that the received data can be decrypted as-is, that no transformation prior to decryption is necessary.

Field http_get_header (0x000c) contains instructions on how to generate the HTTP request that the beacon sends to the team server to obtain tasks it should execute. By default, this is done with a GET request. For the default profile, like this sample, the instructions explain how to transform the metadata. The encrypted metadata has to be BASE64 encoded, and then transmitted via the Cookie header.

Field http_post_header (0x000d) contains instructions on how to generate the HTTP request that the beacon sends to the team server to report the results (callbacks) of the tasks it has executed. By default, this is done with a POST request. For the default profile, like this sample, the instructions explain how to transform the session id and the encrypted callback data.

The session id has just to be transmitted via the id parameter in the POST request.

For the encrypted callback data (output), the instructions are just a print statement: this means that the data to be transmitted can be transmitted as-is, that no transformation prior to posting is necessary.

That was a malicious beacon with a default profile.

Now let’s take a look at another malicious beacon, with a custom profile:

For the received data (field 0x000b or the input, e.g., encrypted tasks received by the beacon), the following instructions need to be applied:

  1. Receiving the data (print)
  2. Removing 1522 bytes from the end of the received data
  3. Removing 84 bytes from the beginning of the remaining data
  4. Removing 3931 bytes from the beginning of the remaining data
  5. Decoding this remaining data with a BASE64 decoder for URLs
  6. XOR-ing the BASE64 decoded data with a 4-byte key that is found at the beginning of the remaining data

Remark that 1768.py reports these instructions twice: once in a human-readable format (see screenshot), and once in an encoded format between [] that my other tools can parse: [7:Input,4,1:1522,2:84,2:3931,13,15]

This data is transmitted by the beacon to the team server, via an HTTP request (GET in this sample). The headers to be included in this HTTP GET request are specified in field 0x000c:

And the metadata needs to be encoded and transmitted as follows (field 0x000c, Build Metadata):

  1. Encoding the encrypted metadata with a BASE64 encoder for URLs
  2. prepending value __cfduid= to this base64-encoded data
  3. Including the resulting data in the GET request via the Cookie header

For the transmitted data (field 0x000d or the output, e.g., encrypted callbacks sent by the beacon), the following instructions (Build Output) need to be applied:

  1. XOR-ing the encrypted data with a 4-byte key random key, that is prepended to the XORed data
  2. Encoding the resulting data with a BASE64 encoder
  3. Transmitting the data (print)

Field 0x000d also specifies the headers that need to be added to the POST request:

And field 0x000d also specifies how to transform and transmit the session id. The following instructions (Build SessionId) need to be applied:

  1. XOR-ing the session id with a 4-byte key random key, that is prepended to the XORed data
  2. Encoding the resulting data with a BASE64 encoder for URLs
  3. Including this encoded data to the POST request via parameter __cfduid

The encoded instructions (for my other tools) are: [7:Output,15,13,4]

Remark: although I show these instructions for HTTP communication, they are also applied for other protocols, like HTTPS and DNS.

1768_v0_0_9.zip (https)
MD5: 2AFD580D2BDA78F6FA8A240947661E1F
SHA256: 45841091C6AF270A508674B31389CCB1ED44346CD3A146FBE7AFC21940B00548

Wednesday 3 November 2021

New Tool: cs-extract-key.py

Filed under: Announcement,Encryption,My Software — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

cs-extract-key.py is a tool designed to extract cryptographic keys from Cobalt Strike beacon process memory dumps.

This tool was already available in my beta repository.

This tool can extract cryptographic keys from process memory dumps of a version 3.x beacon directly:

And from version 4.x together with encrypted data extracted from network capture:

More details can be found in the man page, and in and upcoming blog post.

cs-extract-key_V0_0_1.zip (https)
MD5: 4102A5A5BFD4D432DA4A721D43F568F5
SHA256: BBEDF6CBFFF51669187694F463C32A49F53420BEDF8B76508D06850643DE334F

Friday 22 October 2021

New Tool: cs-decrypt-metadata.py

Filed under: Announcement,Encryption,My Software,Reverse Engineering — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

cs-decrypt-metadata.py is a new tool, developed to decrypt the metadata of a Cobalt Strike beacon.

An active beacon regularly checks in with its team server, transmitting medata (like the AES key, the username & machine name, …) that is encrypted with the team server’s private key.

This tool can decrypt this data, provided:

  1. you give it the file containing the private (and public) key, .cobaltstrike.beacon_keys (option -f)
  2. you give it the private key in hexadecimal format (option -p)
  3. the private key is one of the 6 keys in its repository (default behavior)

I will publish blog posts explaining how to use this tool.

Here is a quick example:

cs-decrypt-metadata_V0_0_1.zip (https)
MD5: 31F94659163A6E044A011B0D82623413
SHA256: 50ED1820DC63009B579D7D894D4DD3C5F181CFC000CA83B2134100EE92EEDD9F

Thursday 21 October 2021

“Public” Private Cobalt Strike Keys

Filed under: Encryption,Malware,My Software — Didier Stevens @ 18:05

I found 6 private keys used by malicious Cobalt Strike servers. There’s a significant number of malicious CS servers on the Internet that reuse these keys, thus allowing us to decrypt their C2 traffic. For the details, I recommend reading the following blog post I wrote “Cobalt Strike: Using Known Private Keys To Decrypt Traffic – Part 1“.

I integrated these keys in the database (1768.json) of my tool 1768.py (starting version 0.0.8).

Whenever you analyze a beacon with 1768.py that uses a public key with a known private key, the report will point this out:

And when you use option verbose, the private key will be included:

If you want to integrated these 6 keys in your own tools: be my guest. You can find these key pairs in 1768.json.

Monday 11 October 2021

Update: 1768.py Version 0.0.8

Filed under: My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

This new version brings an update to the statistics in file 1768.json.

1768_v0_0_8.zip (https)
MD5: C410C38FC2B5F0B2C3104D7FC1D35C58
SHA256: 9374650575E0F15331CE05ACFD2BFA4CD6EBEB1497207B9B6D4B1F7A0214457D

Sunday 3 October 2021

New Tool: onion-connect-service-detection.py

Filed under: My Software,Networking — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

To better understand how nmap does service detection, I implemented a tool in Python that tries to do (more or less) the same. nmap detects what service is listening on a port, by sending it probes (particular byte sequences) and matching it with expected replies. These probes and replies can be found in file nmap-service-probes.

It allows me to experiment with service detection.

By default onion-connect-service-detection.py connects to service ports over the Tor network.

Here is an example where I use the tool to detect services on the 10 most popular ports (top:10) of example.com. With a time-out of 5 seconds.

onion-connect-service-detection_V0_0_1.zip (https)
MD5: 8C6D94E1CEE4747E18807CB95FCB1EE9
SHA256: ADC8D937522F55CC47C91E5DC01B2B7D22372E5726542DAF84134279643F8297

Wednesday 29 September 2021

Update: base64dump.py Version 0.0.17

Filed under: My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

This new version of base64dump brings 2 new features:

  • support for ASCII85 encoding: a85
  • selecting of the largest result: -s L
base64dump_V0_0_17.zip (https)
MD5: B535A0B9E73D068380078FC5006756E8
SHA256: DDC67BEBC5C3407213673C0228E84796E6816294A029997542BA7DD9AF659C4E

Wednesday 22 September 2021

Update: re-search.py Version 0.0.18

Filed under: My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

This version has some Python3/Linux/MacOS fixes.

re-search_V0_0_18.zip (https)
MD5: 1BCA3B59B719FAFD6016D2F9F32F1A05
SHA256: 9E4807D3CE0EC320028AC760D3915F4FC0CBF6EC6E20FC9B2C91C54E74E6F548

Saturday 21 August 2021

Update: AnalyzePESig Version 0.0.0.8

Filed under: My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 11:52

This new version of AnalyzePESig, my tool to analyze the digital signature of PE files, brings some major updates:

  • Support for UNICODE filenames
  • Reintroduction of the capability to verify the signature of non-PE files, like .MSI files

And several bug fixes.

AnalyzePESig_V0_0_0_8.zip (https)
MD5: C14A2C8AA91D34F534B4F76E7014E3A9
SHA256: BCCF90BF6E4C26C33BF16DA20CF220DAE8D748B942224659DC720B35BB8EFE86

Friday 20 August 2021

Update: pdf-parser.py Version 0.7.5

Filed under: My Software,PDF,Uncategorized,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

This is a bug fix version.

pdf-parser_V0_7_5.zip (https)
MD5: D39E98981E6FEA48BF61CA2F78ED0B09
SHA256: 5D970AFAC501A71D4FDDEECBD63060062226BF1D587A6A74702DDA79B5C2D3FB

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