Didier Stevens

Thursday 2 November 2017

Analyzing Metasploit’s Office Maldoc

Filed under: maldoc — Didier Stevens @ 0:00

Metasploit has a module to create Microsoft Word document with macros (.docm): office_word_macro.

Documents generated with this module are not that hard to analyze and detect, because they always use the same VBA code. As I explain in my workshops and trainings, although the “new” Office file format (OOXML) is a ZIP container for XML files, VBA code is still stored inside a binary file (vbaProject.bin) using the “old” file format (Compound File Binary Format, or ole file as I like to call it). This Metasploit module always uses the same vbaProject.bin file (inside the template file), and I explain how to analyze and detect it in this video:

I show YARA rules and ClamAV signatures in this video to detect documents created with this Metasploit module.

Here are the YARA rules:

  Version 0.0.1 2017/08/20
  Source code put in public domain by Didier Stevens, no Copyright
  Use at your own risk

    2017/08/20: start

import "hash"

rule metasploit_office_word_macro_ID_GUID {

        description = "Detect Metasploit's office_word_macro unique GUID"

        $ID = "ID=\"{BB64F33D-3617-FA44-AFC9-63F65314A8A3}\""


rule metasploit_office_word_macro_vbaproject_bin_zipped {
        description = "Detect .docm files created with Metasploit's office_word_macro exploit"

        $a = {776F72642F76626150726F6A6563742E62696EED3B0D7853D775E75D3D0959B6B1640C7120908B4CB04C2421C9B22D3B98EADF86D860B0032421C1FA79C222B2A44A4FD8E4A795B1D3928435AC5D33CAD20E42DAA62DEB489AB07EE9BA8976FB42F3B5DF48D3ED4BBA7531C99666FDBE0E4AB32F69B6C43BF7BD275BFE2350BA}

        $a and hash.md5(@a + 19, 5962) == "e5995aba8551f30cc15c87ee49fb834a"

The first rule (metasploit_office_word_macro_ID_GUID) detects the vbaProject.bin file used by this Metasploit module based on the unique ID ({BB64F33D-3617-FA44-AFC9-63F65314A8A3}) stored inside stream PROJECTwm of file vbaProject.bin. This rule must be used with a tool that can scan inside ZIP files, like zipdump.py or ClamAV.

If you can’t use such a tool, you can still use the second rule (metasploit_office_word_macro_vbaproject_bin_zipped) with the standard YARA scanner: this rule looks for the datastream of the compressed vbaProject.bin file inside Office files.

Here are the ClamAV signatures:

Signature to be put inside a .ndb file:
Signature to be put inside a .hdb file:

The first signature (metasploit_office_word_macro_ID_GUID) detects the unique ID (just like the first YARA rule), and the second signature (metasploit_office_word_macro_vbaproject_bin) detects the vbaProject.bin file based on the MD5 hash (1788454ae206101fa6febf99005ce03b).

ClamAV is able to scan inside OOXML/ZIP files.

1 Comment »

  1. […] Analyzing Metasploit’s Office Maldoc […]

    Pingback by Overview of Content Published In November | Didier Stevens — Wednesday 6 December 2017 @ 0:00

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