Didier Stevens

Monday 23 June 2014

Stoned Bitcoin

Filed under: Encryption,Forensics,Malware — Didier Stevens @ 20:29

There are reports of anti-virus false positive detections of Bitcoin files. More precisely for the old Stoned computer virus.

I found the smoking gun! These reports should not be dismissed as hoaxes.

I’ve identified 2 Bitcoin transactions that contain byte sequences found in the Stoned computer virus. Here they are:

Both transactions appear in blocks dated 2014-04-04.

The first transaction has byte sequences of the Stoned computer virus in the address of transaction outputs 1, 2, 3 and 4:

Txout 1:
 value: 1
 txOutScriptLength: 25
 txOutScript: 'OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0700ba8000cd13eb4990b90300ba000100000000 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG'
 Stoned virus byte sequence:     0700ba8000cd13eb4990b90300ba0001
Txout 2:
 value: 1
 txOutScriptLength: 25
 txOutScript: 'OP_DUP OP_HASH160 b8010333dbb10133d29c00000000000000000000 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG'
 Stoned virus byte sequence:     b8010333dbb10133d29c
Txout 3:
 value: 1
 txOutScriptLength: 25
 txOutScript: 'OP_DUP OP_HASH160 750e33c08ed8a03f04a8017503e8070000000000 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG'
 Stoned virus byte sequence:     750e33c08ed8a03f04a8017503e80700
Txout 4:
 value: 1
 txOutScriptLength: 25
 txOutScript: 'OP_DUP OP_HASH160 b8010333dbb10133d29c00000000000000000000 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG'
 Stoned virus byte sequence:     b8010333dbb10133d29c

I’ve submitted this transaction to VirusTotal: 16 detections. I also submitted the block containing this transaction: 5 detections.

The second transaction has a byte sequence of the Stoned computer virus in the address of transaction output 43:

Txout 43:
 value: 10
 txOutScriptLength: 25
 txOutScript: 'OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0400b801020e07bb000233c98bd1419c00000000 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG'
 Stoned virus byte sequence:     0400b801020e07bb000233c98bd1419c

I’ve submitted this transaction to VirusTotal: 14 detections. I also submitted the block containing this transaction: 4 detections.

This is a likely explanation why there were “Stoned Virus” anti-virus alerts for Bitcoin blockchain files reported in the news.

Stuffing messages in the address of the output(s) of a transaction is a well known method to insert messages in the Bitcoin blockchain. The drawback is that the Bitcoins send to these addresses are irrevocably lost, because these addresses have no (known) private key. That is why only very small amounts will be transferred (1 and 10 Satoshis in these transactions). The message is limited to 20 bytes (the size of the raw address used in the output).

But I believe that all output addresses in these transactions (except for the last output) are byte sequences found in malware.

When I run ClamAV’s sigtool on these transactions (with a recent database), a lot of signatures are found:

VIRUS NAME: Gen.600;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1321)
VIRUS NAME: Gen.696;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1356)
VIRUS NAME: Gen.801;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1798)
VIRUS NAME: Stoned.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 200)
VIRUS NAME: Stoned.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 266)
VIRUS NAME: Syslock.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 369)
VIRUS NAME: Syslock.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (2 matches at offsets: 404 368)
VIRUS NAME: Ten-Bytes;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 606)
VIRUS NAME: Terminator.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 642)
VIRUS NAME: Terror.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 675)
VIRUS NAME: Terror.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 709)
VIRUS NAME: Terror.4;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 744)
VIRUS NAME: Terror;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 810)
VIRUS NAME: Tiny-163.A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 845)
VIRUS NAME: Tiny-163.C;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 879)
VIRUS NAME: Tiny-A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 912)
VIRUS NAME: Tori-1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1014)
VIRUS NAME: Tree;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1050)
VIRUS NAME: TUQ.RPVS;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 538)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-1049.A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1083)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-2144.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1117)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-3103;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1152)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-311.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1184)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-311.D;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1219)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-311.E;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1252)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-516.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1287)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-601;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1320)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-707.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1390)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-707.C;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1422)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-711.C;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1458)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-830;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1490)
VIRUS NAME: USSR-948.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1525)
VIRUS NAME: V1244;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1661)
VIRUS NAME: V191;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1697)
VIRUS NAME: V-1L;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1594)
VIRUS NAME: V200.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1729)
VIRUS NAME: Vacsina.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1900)
VIRUS NAME: Vacsina.3;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1934)
VIRUS NAME: Vacsina.4;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1966)
VIRUS NAME: VCS (Clam);MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1830)
VIRUS NAME: VHP-361.A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1864)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna-1028;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2172)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (2 matches at offsets: 2068 2034)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna.1-1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2068)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2102)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna-62.B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2205)
VIRUS NAME: Vienna.7;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2137)
VIRUS NAME: TinyFamily2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 946)
VIRUS NAME: TinyFamily3;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 980)

VIRUS NAME: Italian.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 231)
VIRUS NAME: Italian-Generic;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 266)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 301)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem-1361;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 469)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem.2.Nemesis;MATCH: ** YES ** (2 matches at offsets: 1592 334)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem.5;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 368)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem.7;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 403)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem.9;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 436)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem-Family.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 504)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem-USA;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 572)
VIRUS NAME: Kharkov-1024;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 605)
VIRUS NAME: Label.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 674)
VIRUS NAME: Label.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 707)
VIRUS NAME: Leech.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 741)
VIRUS NAME: Leprosy.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 777)
VIRUS NAME: Leprosy.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 809)
VIRUS NAME: Leprosy.4;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 843)
VIRUS NAME: Leprosy-A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 879)
VIRUS NAME: LOL;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 641)
VIRUS NAME: Lozinsky.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 913)
VIRUS NAME: Macho;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1015)
VIRUS NAME: Minnow;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1081)
VIRUS NAME: Mirror.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1117)
VIRUS NAME: Mis-Speller;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1149)
VIRUS NAME: MIX1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1217)
VIRUS NAME: MIX1-B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1251)
VIRUS NAME: Mixer-1A;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1319)
VIRUS NAME: Mixer-1B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1354)
VIRUS NAME: Mix-I;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1286)
VIRUS NAME: MLTI.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 945)
VIRUS NAME: MLTI.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 981)
VIRUS NAME: Mummy;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1422)
VIRUS NAME: New-COM.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1659)
VIRUS NAME: Nomenclatura.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1693)
VIRUS NAME: Nothing;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1729)
VIRUS NAME: NPox-1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1491)
VIRUS NAME: NV-71;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1525)
VIRUS NAME: Ontario.3;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1932)
VIRUS NAME: Orion-263;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1966)
VIRUS NAME: Oropax.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2001)
VIRUS NAME: Oropax.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2035)
VIRUS NAME: OV;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1762)
VIRUS NAME: PC-Bandit;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2067)
VIRUS NAME: PRSC1024;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 2203)
VIRUS NAME: Boot.OneHalf;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1898)
VIRUS NAME: Jerusalem-PuertoExe;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 537)
VIRUS NAME: Mistake.TypoBoot;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1183)
VIRUS NAME: MtE.mem.2-staticsig;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1387)
VIRUS NAME: MutationEng-NE;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1455)
VIRUS NAME: OldYankee.1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1796)
VIRUS NAME: OldYankee.2;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1829)
VIRUS NAME: OldYankee.3;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1863)
VIRUS NAME: Stoned-B;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1625)
VIRUS NAME: Nado.Lover.602-1;MATCH: ** YES ** (1 match at offset: 1557)

My conclusion: these transactions are a deliberate attempt to generate as much false positive anti-virus detections as possible on systems that store Bitcoin transactions on disk. Virus signatures were stuffed in the address of the outputs of these transactions.

And I don’t think the attempt was limited to these 2 transactions. Around the same time, I find other transactions were the output addresses also ends with null bytes:

Hash: edb83f04e68bfe78bbfe7ce80d33e85acb9335c96ead5712517b8c70d1f27b38
Hash: 7e49504c7cecea7ea95d78ff14687878ba581a21dc0772805d2925c617514129
Hash: f65895220f04aa0084d9abae938d3f517893e3afbffe25fc9e7073e02331b9ed
Hash: 8a445d12f225a21d36bb78da747efd2e74861fcd033757da572c0434d423acd1
Hash: 2814673f0952b936d578d73197bfd371cefbd73c6294bab16de1575a4c3f6e80
Hash: 5dbb9df056c36457228a841d6cc98ac90967bc88411c95372d3c2d92c18060f8

You can also look at the input addresses of these transactions to find other, similar transactions:

 

I plan to discuss the methods and tools I used to find and analyze these transactions in an upcoming blog post.

Friday 14 March 2014

Handling McAfee Quarantine Files

Filed under: Malware — Didier Stevens @ 10:46

Last time I opened a McAfee quarantine file (.bup) with a hex editor, I saw something I didn’t notice before: D0 CF 11 E0

The fileformat used for McAfee quarantine files is the Compound File Binary Format (also used for .doc, .xls, .msi, …).

With this new info and Google’s help I found @herrcore‘s punbup Python program. This program uses a Python module to handle CFB files, it does not rely on 7-zip for this. This has a big advantage: one is no longer required to write the quarantined files to disk to analyze them.

For example, with option -c md5 you can get the md5 hashes of the quarantined files, without these files being written to disk.

I added a couple of extra features which @herrcore has kindly merged into his repository. These new options allow one to perform a hexdump (-x -X), ASCII dump (-a -A) or dump (-f) of the quarantined file(s). Here is a usage example:

punbup.py -f quarantine.bup | pdfid.py

This command performs an analysis with pdfid of the quarantined PDF file, without writing the malicious PDF file to disk.

Monday 3 March 2014

Forensic Use of CAT Files

Filed under: Encryption,Forensics,Malware — Didier Stevens @ 0:16

I found this executable A0000623.sys with 6 detections on VirusTotal. Are these false positives or true positives?

The file was found in the _restore system folder. It looks like it is a Windows system file (tcp.sys), but maybe it is infected. It has no digital signature.

With the help of Google, I was able to trace it back to MS05-019: WindowsXP-KB893066-x86-ENU.exe. But unfortunately, WindowsXP-KB893066-x86-ENU.exe can no longer be downloaded from Microsoft’s site, as they published a new release for this patch: WindowsXP-KB893066-v2-x86-ENU.exe.

Fortunately, I found another file in this _restore folder: A0000615.cat. This is a catalog file that Microsoft uses to sign Windows executables. With Sysinternals’ sigcheck tool and this catalog file, I was able to confirm that this is a signed Windows executable and conclude that the detections are false positives.

I will release a new version of my AnalyzePESig tool that accepts an optional catalog file.

Saturday 14 December 2013

Update: virustotal-submit.py V0.0.3

Filed under: Malware,My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:21

There is extra error handling in this new version.

virustotal-search and virustotal-submit have their own page now: VirusTotal Tools.

virustotal-submit_V0_0_3.zip (https)
MD5: 3F9F5421F711E2930AB6F80D87DF9E2B
SHA256: 37CCE3E8469DE097912CB23BAC6B909C9C7F5A5CEE09C9279D32BDB9D6E23BCC

Monday 2 December 2013

4 Times Faster virustotal-search.py

Filed under: Malware,My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 0:26

This is an important update to virustotal-search.py.

Rereading the VT API, I noticed I missed the fact that the search query accepts up to 4 search terms.

This new version submits 4 hashes at a time, making it up to 4 times faster than previous versions.

virustotal-search_V0_1_0.zip (https)
MD5: 0141D3677F759317034C416EBF9FF30D
SHA256: FE07859C3FA09DA120D3104FF982AF0D78ADFCF099A10E46E254823502DF4EE4

Monday 21 October 2013

Update: Suspender V0.0.0.4

Filed under: Forensics,Malware,My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 10:19

Suspender is a DLL that suspends all threads of a process.

This new version adds an option to suspend a process when it exits. Rename the dll to suspenderx.dll to activate this option (x stands for eXit).

When DllMain is called with DLL_PROCESS_DETACH and the reserved argument is not NULL, the process is exiting. So that’s the trigger to suspend it.

20131021-121321

Suspender_V0_0_0_4.zip (https)
MD5: 629255337FE0CA9F631B1A7177D158F0
SHA256: 8E63152620541314926878D01469E2E922298C147740BDEAF7FC6B70EB9305EF

Sunday 4 August 2013

Quickpost: Rovnix PCAP

Filed under: Forensics,Malware,Networking,Quickpost — Didier Stevens @ 21:04

Microsoft’s Malware Protection Center has a blogpost on a version of Rovnix that uses its own TCP/IP stack.

I used Wireshark to capture the network traffic generated by this sample when it is executed in a VMware guest.

20130804-225716

I ran the sample on a XP SP3 guest machine in VMware. The hostname is XPPROSP3 (this name will appear in the HTTP GET request).
The guest uses NAT.
I ran the Wireshark capture on my host machine on the VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter.
I removed some traffic coming from my host machine (NetBIOS Name Service and DHCPv6 to be precise).

When I executed the sample on XPPROSP3, it rebooted after a few seconds.

The trace:
The 37 second gap between packet 6 and 7 is due to the reboot of XPPROSP3
Packet 44: DNS request for youtubeflashserver
There are 3 HTTP requests. Notice User-Agent FWVersionTestAgent in all 3 GET requests.
Packet 50: first GET request with hostname XPPROSP3 as a parameter. Response: 404
Packet 61: second GET request, malformed. Response: 400
Packet 70: third GET request, malformed. Response: 400

rovnix-capture-filtered.zip (https)
MD5: C941D1716B6248C3FBFB4DFFA8AD2E86
SHA256: 51EDA61199DD9EDC1E50C5A9B5A4B69F32DB74E90CF098849554C56217D06EFD


Quickpost info


Friday 26 July 2013

MSI: The Case Of The Invalid Signature

Filed under: Forensics,Malware,Windows 7 — Didier Stevens @ 22:01

I found a suspicious file on a Windows XP machine. I was able to trace its origin back to a Windows Installer package (.msi). This package in c:\windows\installer had an invalid digital signature. Like this:

20130726-233848

Very suspicious.

A bit later I found another msi package containing the same suspicious file. But this time, the package had a valid digital signature. What’s going on?

After a deep dive into the internals of msi packages, I found the answer.

When an msi package is installed, it is cached inside the Windows Installer directory (%windir%\Installer). Prior to Windows Installer 5.0 (released with Windows 7), cached packages were stripped of their embedded cab files. But with digitally signed msi files, the signature remained inside the file: the digitally signed file was modified, hence the signature was invalidated. This behavior changed with Windows Installer 5.0: cached packages are no longer stripped, hence the signature remains valid.

This blogpost by Heath Stewart explains this change in more detail. Unfortunately, my Google-skills were not good enough to find this blogpost prior to my deep dive into msi files. Hindsight Googling FTW! 😉

Friday 3 May 2013

VirusTotal: Searching And Submitting

Filed under: Malware,My Software,Update — Didier Stevens @ 8:47

This is an update for virustotal-search.py and a release of a new tool: virustotal-submit.py. I created this new tool because I needed to submit a sample stored in a password protected ZIP-file (not the ZIP-file), without extracting the sample to disk.

To submit a file to VirusTotal, you just run virustotal-submit.py sample.exe.

If you submit a ZIP file, virustotal-submit.py will extract the first file to memory and submit that to VirusTotal. The ZIP file can be password protected with password “infected”. To submit the ZIP file itself, use option -z.

To submit a batch of samples, create a textfile with the name of the files to submit and use option -f.

virustotal-submit.py supports proxies too (Python variables HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY or environment variables http_proxy and https_proxy).

Python module poster is required for this tool.

virustotal-submit_V0_0_1.zip (https)
MD5: 8793C3276822DDE36BA0804D3390AD4D
SHA256: F17B9EEC408833039AE63FCED9F6114F99AADFBE9D547AE88B2C3A6E54AE91B4

Updates to virustotal-search.py:

  • uses json or simplejson module
  • proxies are supported (Python variables HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY or environment variables http_proxy and https_proxy)
  • option -g forces virustotal-search.py to use the local database in the same directory as the program

virustotal-search_V0_0_8.zip (https)
MD5: 011C88A9C9026A32DA473187A64E880C
SHA256: 30711202BB0CD01A17AFA7BB8BBFE1545B6A840BDB91D83C7753300EF7E71A8F

Thursday 8 November 2012

XORSearch for OSX

Filed under: Forensics,Malware,My Software,OSX — Didier Stevens @ 21:58

I made a very small change to XORSearch’s source code (dropped malloc.h) so that it compiles on OSX.

You can find the new version on XORSearch’s page.

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